*Including a scene investigation and autopsy. † Tandem MS can identify selected disorders of fatty acid oxidation and amino acid metabolism in dried postmortem blood samples (3).
Sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), or the death of an infant aged <1 year that remains unexplained after a thorough investigation*, is the third most common cause of death among infants in the United States (1) . Sudden, unexplained deaths also occur among children aged >1 year; however, the number of these deaths is not well documented. Certain cases of SIDS and sudden unexplained death beyond infancy might be attributable to complications of unrecognized metabolic diseases (2) (3) (4) . Tandem mass spectrometry (tandem MS) can be used to screen for several of these disorders (5). Despite the low prevalence of these diseases (6), newborn screening for these disorders has been found to compare favorably with the cost of other screening programs (7). However, the contribution of these diseases to early childhood deaths is not well understood. To determine the proportion of sudden, unexpected early childhood deaths associated with selected metabolic diseases, CDC, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (ME) in Virginia, and a private laboratory conducted a population-based study. This report summarizes the results of the study, which indicate that 1% of children had a positive postmortem metabolic screen using tandem MS. Of the eight children with positive screening tests, seven might have had improved outcomes had they been identified and treated during the newborn period. The use of tandem MS in newborn screening programs could offer an opportunity to prevent early childhood mortality.
The Virginia ME's records, including available autopsy reports, were reviewed for children who died before age 3 years during 1996-2001. In Virginia, the deaths of all children who die before age 18 months and whose death is attributed to SIDS, who die suddenly when in apparent good health, or who die when not under the care of a physician must be examined by the ME (8). For each child, data were recorded on demographics, the cause of death assigned by the ME, and the results of metabolic screening using tandem MS and dried postmortem blood samples † , if available. Additional medical information was collected for each child who had a positive metabolic screening result. For children without a screening result (32%), an archived, dried postmortem blood spot on standard metabolic screening filter paper, if available, was sent to an independent reference laboratory (Neo Gen Screening, Inc., Bridgeville, Pennsylvania) for testing and interpretation (3) . Confirmatory molecular testing, if testing was available, was performed for each child with a positive screening test. If a confirmatory test using postmortem blood was not available for an identified disease, an independent biochemical geneticist with expertise in tandem MS performed a secondary interpretation of each mass spectrum.
A total of 793 (88%) of the 904 children who died before age 3 years, whose deaths were investigated by the ME, and whose deaths occurred during 1996-2001 were included in the analysis. The remaining children were excluded because neither postmortem metabolic screening results nor stored postmortem blood were available. Among children excluded from the study, none had a cause of death listed as SIDS. Of the 793 children included in the study, eight (1%) had a positive screening result suggestive of a metabolic disease. Four children had screening results that suggested the presence of fatty acid oxidation disorders, and four had possible organic acidemias. Molecular testing for the most common genetic mutation (G985A) seen in medium-chain acyl-CoA dehydrogenase deficiency, a fatty acid oxidation disorder, confirmed the diagnosis in two children. For the remaining six children with positive tandem MS metabolic screens, no confirmatory tests using postmortem blood were available. However, their mass spectra printouts were confirmed to be indicative of the identified disorder by a second independent biochemical geneticist specializing in tandem MS who was blinded to the previous spectra interpretation.
Sex, race/ethnicity, and age group were not associated with having a positive screening result (Table) . Five children had fatty livers at the time of autopsy; this finding is used occasionally to identify children for whom postmortem screening for these diseases is required. However, three children had normal liver pathology. The median age at death of the eight children with positive metabolic screens was 7.5 months (range: 2.0 days-2.7 years). Of these eight children, seven might have benefitted from identification by newborn screening. One child died at age 2 days and would not have benefitted from newborn screening because results would not have been available in time to initiate treatment. All of the children had medical histories and manners of death that were consistent with the natural history of these diseases (9).
Editorial Note: The findings in this report suggest that, during 1996-2001, undiagnosed metabolic diseases were contributing factors in 1% of unexpected deaths in young children in Virginia. Postmortem metabolic screening might have identified a cause of death for certain children who died unexpectedly. Because three of the children with positive tandem MS metabolic screens did not have fat in their livers, performing postmortem metabolic disease screening on the basis of abnormal liver pathology might not have identified all affected children. Approximately 5% of sudden infant deaths might be associated with metabolic diseases (2) . The postmortem identification of affected children should prompt testing of siblings who might be affected by the same genetic disorder and might benefit from effective interventions. No population-based studies of survival have been performed for these conditions. Of the eight children with positive tandem MS metabolic screening tests, seven might have had improved outcomes if they had been identified by newborn screening and effective therapy had been initiated in time to prevent their deaths. Newborn screening programs considering including testing for metabolic diseases that can be detected by tandem MS (5) can use these results to estimate the number of children who might benefit from early identification and treatment.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, no test was available to confirm that six of the identified children had the disease suggested by tandem MS metabolic screening. However, the predictive value of tandem MS metabolic screening using postmortem blood is high for the fatty acid oxidation disorders identified (4). The positive predictive value of tandem MS metabolic screening for organic acidemias has not been established. Second, the contribution of metabolic diseases that can be identified by tandem MS to unexpected deaths might be underestimated. Affected persons sometimes die after age 3 years (9), and these persons were excluded from this study. In addition, children included in this study died in a manner that caused their deaths to fall under the jurisdiction of the Virginia ME; other deaths were not studied. All previously healthy children in Virginia who died suddenly or of an unknown cause should have been referred to the ME and would have been eligible for the study; however, a child with an undiagnosed metabolic disease who was under the care of a physician and whose death was attributed to another apparently clear cause (e.g., infection) might not have been referred. Finally, the sensitivity and specificity of tandem MS using postmortem blood is not known.
The data in this report illustrate one aspect of the natural history of the diseases detectable by tandem MS and could be useful to programs considering the addition of this technology to their newborn screening programs. These programs should consider several factors when deciding to add tests for metabolic diseases, including the prevalence (6) and natural history of the diseases, the availability of effective interventions, the costs and benefits of newborn screening (7), and the reliability of available screening technologies (10). On July 5, 2003, Taiwan was removed from the World Health Organization (WHO) list of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-affected countries. As of July 9, a total of 671 probable cases of SARS had been reported in Taiwan (Figure) . On February 21, the first identified SARS patient in Taiwan returned from travel to Guangdong Province, mainland China, by way of Hong Kong. Initial efforts to control SARS appeared to be effective; these efforts included isolation of suspect and probable SARS patients, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for health-care workers (HCWs) and visitors, and quarantine of contacts of known SARS patients (1) . However, beginning in mid-April, unrecognized cases of SARS led to a large nosocomial cluster and subsequent SARS-associated coronavirus transmission to other health-care facilities and community settings (2) . In response to the growing epidemic, additional measures were taken to limit nosocomial and community transmission of SARS, including more widespread use of quarantine. By the end of the epidemic, 131,132 persons had been placed in quarantine, including 50,319 close contacts of SARS patients and 80,813 travelers from WHO-designated SARS-affected areas (Table) . This report describes the quarantine measures used in Taiwan and discusses the need for further evaluation of quarantine and other control measures used to prevent SARS.
Beginning March 18, persons who had been in close contact with a SARS patient were quarantined for 10-14 days (Level A quarantine) (Figure) ; initially, quarantine was for 14 days, but after June 10, the time was changed to 10 days in accordance with the incubation period for SARS. Close contact was defined as the following eight types of exposures: 1) HCWs who were not wearing PPE when evaluating and/or treating a SARS patient; 2) family members who provided care for a SARS patient; 3) persons who worked in the same office and whose cubicles or work stations were located within 3 meters (10 feet) of a SARS patient's work area; 4) friends of a SARS patient, as deemed appropriate by local health authorities; 5) classmates or teachers of a SARS patient who attended a class for >1 hour with the patient; 6) persons who sat in the same or adjacent three rows from a SARS patient on an airplane flight; 7) passengers and drivers of public transportation who traveled for >1 hour in the same bus or train cabin with a SARS patient; and 8) persons who had contact with a person under quarantine who received care in a medical facility in which a cluster of SARS occurred. Hospital staff and patients who had contact with a SARS patient were quarantined, usually in a health-care facility. All others were quarantined at home. Homeless persons, who often use hospital toilet facilities, were asked to go voluntarily to government quarantine centers under Level A quarantine.
During April 28-July 4, travelers arriving on airplane flights from WHO-designated SARS-affected areas were quarantined for 10 days (Level B quarantine). Arriving passengers could choose quarantine in an airport transit hotel, at home, or at a quarantine site designated and paid for by their employer. If these options were not available, the traveler was quarantined at a government quarantine center located at military bases. On June 9, quarantine regulations were eased for staff of Taiwanese companies based in mainland China who were returning to Taiwan for business. Travelers in this category were allowed to conduct business if they wore surgical masks. When not conducting business, they were to follow the rules of quarantine.
Persons under quarantine were required to stay where they were quarantined; take their temperature two to three times a day; seek medical attention promptly if they had fever (>100.4 º F [>38 º C]), cough, shortness of breath, or other respiratory symptoms; cover their nose and mouth with tissue paper when coughing or sneezing; and wear surgical masks when around other persons and outside the quarantine site. They were not allowed to use public transportation, visit hospitalized patients, or visit crowded public places. Persons under Level A quarantine could leave the quarantine site only for activities deemed necessary by local health authorities; meals were delivered. Persons under Level B quarantine were allowed to leave the quarantine site to seek medical attention, exercise in an open area, purchase meals, dispose of garbage, and perform other activities deemed necessary by local health authorities. All outdoor trips were recorded to facilitate possible future investigations. Failure to comply with quarantine regulations, * Persons with suspect SARS were defined as those who had a temperature of >100.4° F (>38° C) and cough or shortness of breath and, within the 10 days before onset of symptoms, had one or more of the following contact exposures: 1) close contact with a person with probable or suspect SARS, 2) history of travel to an area with recent local transmission of SARS, or 3) residence in an area with recent local transmission of SARS. Persons with probable SARS were defined as those having suspect SARS plus one or more of the following: 1) chest radiograph consistent with findings of pneumonia, 2) acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), 3) an unexplained respiratory illness resulting in death, with an autopsy consistent with ARDS and without another identifiable cause, or 4) laboratory confirmation, including one or more of the following: two oropharyngeal swab specimens positive by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV), serologic specimen positive by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay for SARS antibody, serologic specimen positive by indirect immunofluorescence antibody for SARS antibody, or any specimen positive by viral culture for SARS-CoV. † Includes passengers and drivers of internal public transportation who traveled for >1 hour in the same bus or train cabin with a SARS patient, persons who had contact with a person under quarantine who received care in a medical facility in which a cluster of SARS occurred, and homeless persons. § Discharged suspect and probable SARS patients were required to remain isolated for 10 days after their last symptom. If they were discharged to home, they were monitored by quarantine personnel. ¶ Oropharyngeal swab specimens were obtained for 60 patients; five (8%) specimens were PCR positive. ** Oropharyngeal swab specimens were obtained for 32 patients; 15 (47%) specimens were PCR positive. † † Oropharyngeal swab specimens were obtained for eight patients; no specimen was PCR positive. § § Oropharyngeal swab specimens were obtained for eight patients; one (13%) specimen was PCR positive.
submitting incomplete SARS survey forms, or providing inaccurate contact information was punishable by fines of U.S. $1,765-$8,824 and incarceration of <2 years.
The direct management and supervision of persons under quarantine was conducted by local HCWs or civil servants. This activity included ensuring the initial registration of all persons requiring quarantine; recording each person's whereabouts, with information obtained either by daily visits or telephone calls; overseeing the person's daily temperature recordings; evaluating patients who reported a fever; and directing persons with possible SARS to appropriate medical attention. Local health officials reported daily on the status of quarantined persons to the Taiwan Department of Health through a web-based database.
In addition to these measures, video monitoring was conducted for some persons who were contacts of a SARS patient and quarantined at home. Although the intervention was conceived initially for quarantine violators who were residents of the high-population density areas of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the low number of quarantine violators allowed broader use of this intervention. By mid-May, video monitoring was used for almost all persons living in these cities and under quarantine at home.
At government quarantine facilities, persons were placed in individual rooms (not negative-pressure); meals were delivered. Police guarded the rooms to ensure compliance with quarantine.
Several social supports were developed to ease the burden of quarantine on persons and their families. Service providers telephoned quarantined persons to provide psychologic support. Care was provided for the family members of quarantined persons, including day care and care for ill persons. Persons who completed quarantine received the equivalent of U.S. $147. Quarantined persons could request other social services from local health or civil affairs departments.
Of the 131,132 persons who were quarantined during the SARS epidemic in Taiwan, 286 (0.2%) were fined for violation of quarantine. Of the 50,319 persons placed under Level A quarantine, 4,063 (8.0%) were placed on video monitoring at home. A total of 112 (0.22%) persons had suspect or probable SARS diagnosed while under Level A quarantine. Of the 80,813 persons placed under Level B quarantine, 21 (0.03%) had suspect or probable SARS diagnosed.
The highest percentage of persons who had suspect or probable SARS diagnosed subsequently were among HCWs exposed to a SARS patient (0.34%), family members of a SARS patient (0.33%), and persons on the same airplane flight who sat within three rows of a SARS patient (0.36%). Travelers arriving from SARS-affected areas had the lowest percentage for subsequent SARS diagnosis (0.03%).
Oropharyngeal swab specimens were obtained from 68 (77.0%) of 88 patients with suspect SARS (Table) ; five (7.0%) specimens tested positive by polymerase chain reaction (PCR Editorial Note: Quarantine, the separation and/or restriction of movement of persons who are not ill but are believed to have been exposed to infection to prevent transmission of diseases, was developed in the 14th century but has been implemented rarely on a large scale during the past century (3, 4) . The SARS pandemic has demonstrated that governments and public health officials might use quarantine as a public health tool to prevent infectious diseases, particularly when other preventive interventions (e.g., vaccines and antibiotics) are unavailable. In Taiwan, only a small percentage of persons quarantined had suspect or probable SARS diagnosed subsequently, and an even smaller percentage of persons quarantined had a laboratory-confirmed case of SARS. However, because one infected person could expose others and generate successive waves of infection, the use of quarantine might have prevented additional cases. This possibility should be examined through future mathematical modeling studies. Taiwan was one of several countries that implemented quarantine measures during the global SARS outbreak, and more study is needed to determine whether the logistics and costs of quarantine warrant its use. Such studies should examine both the direct (e.g., stipends, resources, personnel time, and lost work days) and indirect (e.g., social stigma, curtailment of civil liberties [e.g., restrictions on freedom of movement], declining personal and community mental health, and delay in reporting symptoms) costs of quarantine.
Numerous SARS control measures were undertaken simultaneously, making it difficult to determine the independent contribution of any one measure. These other control measures included designating dedicated SARS hospitals throughout the island; constructing additional negative-pressure rooms; instituting fever-screening clinics for all health-care facilities; performing fever screening on all persons entering public buildings and restaurants; and requiring masks for all persons working in restaurants, entering hospitals, and using public transportation systems. Evaluation of the contribution of all control measures, including quarantine, should be performed to determine the appropriate role of each intervention in response to future outbreaks.
Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication -Afghanistan and Pakistan, January 2002-May 2003
Since 1988, when the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis worldwide (1), the number of countries in which polio is endemic has decreased from 127 to seven, including Afghanistan and Pakistan (2). These two countries are considered one epidemiologic block because of their geographic proximity, frequent cross-border population movement, and the presence of genetically similar wild poliovirus (WPV) lineages. Although polio remains endemic in both countries, progress in interrupting poliovirus transmission has been substantial (3). This report describes intensified polio eradication activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan during January 2002-May 2003, summarizes progress made, and highlights the remaining challenges to interrupting poliovirus transmission.
Routine Vaccination
In 
Supplementary Immunization Activities
Since 2000, Afghanistan and Pakistan have conducted frequent supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) that use house-to-house vaccine delivery, including at least four rounds of national immunization days (NIDs)* and three rounds of sub-NIDs (SNIDs) † annually. Areas targeted for SNIDs are those in which various factors (e.g., surveillance results, genetic sequencing, supplementary or routine immunization coverage, and population dynamics) indicate a high risk for continuing virus transmission. In 2002, Pakistan conducted four rounds of NIDs and four rounds of SNIDs in close coordination with Afghanistan, which conducted five rounds of NIDs and three rounds of SNIDs. During 2003, planned SIAs include four rounds of NIDs (in April, May, September, and October) and three rounds of SNIDs (in March, July, and December) in Afghanistan and four rounds of NIDs (in March, April, September, and October) and four rounds of SNIDs (in January, June, July, and December) in Pakistan. In both countries, SIA quality is monitored by independent groups; university teachers and students (in Afghanistan) and private survey companies and university teams (in Pakistan) monitor SIA quality while rounds are being carried out and conduct immediate post-SIA coverage assessments.
To provide additional information about vaccination coverage, national polio eradication programs analyze the OPV vaccination status (routine and supplemental) of children with nonpolio acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) reported through the AFP surveillance system. During 2000-2002, the proportion of nonpolio AFP patients aged <24 months who received <3 OPV doses decreased from 72% to 18% in Afghanistan and from 46% to 28% in Pakistan.
Surveillance for AFP
The quality of AFP surveillance is evaluated by two key indicators established by the World Health Organization (WHO): sensitivity of reporting (target: nonpolio AFP rate of >1 case per 100,000 children aged <15 years) and completeness of stool specimen collection (target: two adequate stool specimens § from >80% of all persons with AFP). In 2002 in Afghanistan, the national nonpolio AFP rate was 3.3, and the adequate stool specimen collection rate was 81%; during January-May 2003, the nonpolio AFP rate increased to 3.8, and the adequate stool specimen collection rate increased to 85% (Table) . In 2002, in Pakistan, the national nonpolio AFP rate was 2.8, reported nonpolio AFP rates in all provinces were >2.0, and adequate stool specimens were collected from 87% of persons with AFP; during January-May 2003, the nonpolio AFP rate increased to 3.0, and the adequate stool specimen collection rate increased to 89% (Table) .
* Nationwide mass campaigns implemented over a short period (days to weeks) in which 2 doses of OPV are administered to all children (usually aged <5 years), regardless of vaccination history, with an interval of 4-6 weeks between doses. † Campaigns similar to NIDs but confined to part of the country. § Two stool specimens collected >24 hours apart, within 14 days of paralysis onset, and adequately shipped to the laboratory (target: >80%).
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July 25, 2003 The WHO-accredited regional reference laboratory at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Islamabad, Pakistan, performs virologic testing of stool specimens from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, including primary virus isolation and intratypic differentiation (ITD). The nonpolio enterovirus (NPEV) isolation rate among stool samples (target: >10% isolation rate) is a combined indicator of the quality of specimen transport (i.e., maintenance of specimens at the appropriate temperature from time of collection until delivery to the laboratory) and sensitivity of laboratory processing. In 2002, NPEV isolation rates for Afghanistan and Pakistan were 15% and 19%, respectively; during January-May 2003, rates were 17% and 20%, respectively (Table) . Laboratory efficiency is measured by the proportion of persons with AFP for whom virus isolation results are available within 28 days of receipt of specimens (target: 80% of persons with AFP). In 2002, the NIH laboratory reported final results for primary virus isolation within 28 days for 99% of specimens received from both Afghanistan and Pakistan. During January-May 2003, the proportion of specimen culture results that were reported within 28 days was 77% from Afghanistan and 94% from Pakistan (Table) . Editorial Note: Progress toward interrupting WPV transmission has continued in both Afghanistan and Pakistan despite armed conflict and ongoing political instability. Important achievements for 2002 include a reduction in the number of WPV cases, further restriction of poliovirus circulation to well-defined zones of transmission, and decreased genetic diversity of isolated wild polioviruses. In addition, both countries obtained support from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization to strengthen their routine vaccination programs.
Incidence of Polio
Despite the progress made, critical challenges to achieving eradication remain in both countries, and overcoming surveillance quality gaps is of critical importance. Although Afghanistan began sentinel surveillance in 1997, systematic active surveillance at major health facilities was initiated only recently. In Pakistan, genetic data for 2002-2003 indicate that surveillance might have missed ongoing transmission for prolonged periods in some areas, including northern NWFP and southern Punjab. In both countries, analysis of OPV status among nonpolio AFP patients indicates that vaccination teams missed a substantial number of children aged <24 months during recent campaigns. Although Afghanistan has returned program quality to levels achieved before armed conflict began in late 2001, increasing security problems within the country, particularly in the south and southeast, have limited access to critical areas during SIAs and might have compromised the quality of AFP surveillance.
For the polio eradication activities in the remaining transmission zones to be improved, close collaboration between the national governments and their partners ¶ and between the Afghanistan and Pakistan programs are critical. A comprehensive communication and advocacy strategy is needed to help motivate and engage district governments and communities, reach persons at high risk during SIAs, and strengthen vaccination teams. For surveillance quality to be improved further and maintained, AFP surveillance performance indicators should be monitored continuously, particularly to detect inadequate performance at the subnational level.
Through the efforts of thousands of health-care workers and volunteers, Afghanistan and Pakistan have made progress toward interrupting WPV transmission. Polio teams in both countries, with government support and commitment, have implemented high-quality strategies. For polio to be eradicated, maintaining this commitment and improving the quality of activities in the remaining transmission zones should be a priority of the national and local governments and their partners. ¶ During the reporting week of July 17-23, six human cases of WNV infection were reported from five states (Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Texas). During the same period, WNV infections were reported in 309 dead corvids (crows and related species), 69 other dead birds, 12 horses, and 144 mosquito pools.
During 2003, a total of 11 human cases of WNV infection have been reported from Texas (n = five), Alabama (n = one), Iowa (n = one), Minnesota (n = one), Ohio (n = one), South Carolina (n = one), and South Dakota (n = one) (Figure) . Among these cases, seven (64%) occurred among men; the median age was 70 years (range: 42-80 years), and the dates of illness onset ranged from May 29 to July 13. .  30  38  ----3  3  37  43  Calif.  11  31  1  3  6  14  2  2  575  899  Alaska  -1  -----1  6  7  H a w a i i  5  2 6  -----3  3  1 5 Guam 
